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NOTES

and
the
Years
Later
220
Commonwealth Is Still Imposing
Laws on the United States:
A Comparative Look at U.S.
Antibribery Legislation and the
United Kingdom's Bribery Act
2010
ABSTRACT

The United States has been combating the bribery of
foreign officials for 35 years through the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act (FCPA). Both domestic and international
prosecutions for bribery remained almost nonexistent for
decades. In recent years, the United States experienced an
explosion of enforcement actions under the FCPA. Broad
enforcement theories and increased prosecutorial effort have
greatly expanded the scope of the FCPA. Moreover, the passage
of the UK Bribery Act in 2010 has forced many U.S.
organizations to face additional and conflicting antibribery
regimes. Although the United States remains the world leader
in prosecuting the bribery of foreign officials, the FCPA has
failed to keep pace with the evolving international standard of
antibribery legislation. As a result, ever-increasing uncertainty
surrounds antibribery compliance and liability. In response to
these concerns, Congress must amend the FCPA accordingly, as
inaction will only exacerbate the current concerns.
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I. INTRODUCTION

Despite the ever-increasing pressures impacting American
businesses and jobs-Why does the United States continue to force
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American companies to spend billions of dollars on bribery
compliance while failing to actually curtail international bribery? Far
from being a fringe issue, antibribery enforcement has become a top
business concern in recent years. 1 It is estimated that bribery
conservatively amounts to a trillion dollars a year, 2 which is equal to
approximately 1.5 percent of the world's gross domestic product
(GDP).3 Almost a quarter of large international organizations have
been approached to pay a bribe within the past 2 years. 4 While
disgorgements of profits and fines under the FCPA 5 can be
significant, 6 even allegations of bribery can require substantial
expenses. 7 Despite facing no formal prosecution under the FCPA,
Avon Products Inc., Weatherford International Ltd., and Wal-Mart
Stores Inc. collectively spent nearly half a billion dollars in the first

On October 1, 2012, the Wall Street Journal featured an article discussing
1.
the increased enforcement of the FCPA and an article discussing the lucrative business
of FCPA compliance experts. See Joe Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 1, 2012), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB1000087239639044
3862604578028462294611352 (noting the development of legal specialties that focus
upon FCPA compliance and defense); see also Joe Palazzolo, How the Sleepy FCPA
Became a Hulk and Why It's Staying that Way, WALL ST. J. L. BLOG (Oct. 2, 2012, 9:31
AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/law/2012/10/02/how-the-sleepy-fcpa-became-a-hulk-and-whyits-staying-that-way/ (profiling the increased enforcement of the FCPA by the SEC and
DOJ).
See Leslie Wayne, Hits, and Misses, in a War on Bribery, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
2.
11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/11/business/corporate-bribery-war-has-hitsand-a-few-misses.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (stating that the World Bank estimates
that bribes paid to government officials conservatively amount to $1 trillion annually).
3.
See
The
World
Factbook, CENTRAL
INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY,
(last visited
https://www.cia.govllibrary/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/xx.html
Sept. 21, 2013) (estimating the world GDP in 2011 as $69.99 trillion).
See Press Release, Ernst & Young LLP, Company Executives Risk Fines
4.
and Jail by Ignoring Anti-Bribery Laws (May 15, 2008), available at
http://www.businesswire.com/news/home/20080515005983/en/Company-ExecutivesRisk-Fines-Jail-Ignoring-Anti-Bribery (discussing the results of Ernst & Young's 10th
Global Fraud Survey, which found that 23 percent of the organizations surveyed had
been approached to pay a bribe within the last 2 years).
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494
5.
(1977) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C.), amended by An Act to
Enhance the Competitiveness of American industry, and For Other Purposes, Pub. L.
No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107 (1988) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff) and
International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L. No. 105-366, 112
Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to 78dd-3, 78ff).
See Press Release, U.S. Sec. and Exch. Comm'n, SEC Charges Siemens AG
6.
for Engaging in Worldwide Bribery (Dec. 15, 2008), available at http://www.sec.gov/
news/press/2008/2008-294.htm (announcing that Siemens agreed to pay $350 million in
disgorgement to settle SEC charges and a $450 million fine to the DOJ to settle
criminal charges).
See Palazzolo, FCPA Inc.: The Business of Bribery, supra note 1 (noting
7.
that in addition to paying civil and criminal fines, Siemens AG incurred around 1.5
million billable hours of legal services in order to investigate and settle bribery
allegations).
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nine months of 2012 defending allegations that employees bribed
foreign officials. 8
The relative strength 9 of U.S. antibribery legislation and
enforcement has effectively reduced the likelihood of foreign actors
requesting bribes from U.S. organizations. 10 However, the
effectiveness of the FCPA comes with ever-increasing costs as
organizations face more legal uncertainty surrounding FCPA
compliance. In-house counsel for the largest companies in the United
States cite the FCPA as one of the three main legal uncertainties
facing their organizations. " Over the past few years, the U.S.
Department of Justice (DOJ) and the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) have dramatically increased their commitment to
FCPA enforcement.1 2 While the DOJ and SEC only brought one
FCPA case in 2000, collectively they filed sixty-seven cases in 2009
alone.13
Not only do American companies face increasing enforcement but
also a far more complicated regulatory regime due to the United
Kingdom's Bribery Act 2010 (Bribery Act).14 The Bribery Act marks
the end of an era of UK dormancy in the enforcement and prosecution
of bribery.15 The Bribery Act differs significantly from the FCPAtherefore, the United States must address the increasing uncertainty
companies face in the antibribery sector by amending the FCPA to
realign with the evolving international standard.

8.
See id. (noting that between January and September 2012 bribery
allocations had "already cost Avon Products Inc., Weatherford International Ltd. and
Wal-Mart Stores Inc. nearly half a billion dollars").
9.
See FRITZ HEIMANN & GILLIAN DELL, TRANSPARENCY INT'L, EXPORTING
CORRUPTION?: COUNTRY ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION
PROGESs REPORT 2012, 8 (2d ed. 2012), available at http://issuu.com/transparency
international/docs/2012_exportingcorruption oecdprogress-en?e=2496456/2042485
("[T]he US continues to lead in foreign bribery prosecutions.").
10.
See Press Release, Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 4 (noting that only 15
percent of U.S. organizations surveyed had experienced an incident of bribery or
corruption in the last 2 years compared to the global average of 24 percent).
11.
See Ashby Jones, Legal Maze's Murkiest Corners, WALL ST. J., Dec. 22 2012,
at Bi (discussing the uncertain areas of the law that most concern in-house counsel in
the United States). FCPA liability concerns are rivaled only by the uncertainty posed
by patent suits and the SEC's whistleblower program. Id.
12.
See Carl Pacini, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: Taking a Bite Out of
Bribery in InternationalBusiness Transactions, 17 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 545,
553-56 (2012) (analyzing trends in FCPA cases).
Id. at 547.
13.
14.
Per UK practice, acts of the United Kingdom do not include the word of
between the name of the act and the year, although they are sometimes incorrectly
referred to as such.
15.
See OECD to Conduct a Further Examination of UK Efforts Against
Bribery, ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV. (Mar. 3, 2007), http://www.oecd.org/
generalloecdtoconductafurtherexaminationofukeffortsagainstbribery.htm
(noting the
weaknesses present in UK antibribery laws).
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This Note examines the major provisions of the FCPA and the
Bribery Act to determine the effects the Bribery Act may have upon
the FCPA and American businesses. Part II summarizes the
development of antibribery legislation in the United States and the
United Kingdom and provides insight into international co-operation
in this field. Part III offers an overview of the major provisions of the
FCPA. Part IV provides an overview of the major provisions of the
Bribery Act and the UK Ministry of Justice's guidance on the act.16
Part V explores the important differences between the two pieces of
legislation. Part VI puts forth recommendations for amendments to
the FCPA that the United States should adopt in the wake of the
Bribery Act. Part VII concludes that the United States needs to
implement changes to the FCPA to reduce uncertainty, update the
FCPA to the evolving international standard, and allow the United
States to maintain its significant influence over the evolution of
international antibribery legislation.

II.

HISTORY OF ANTIBRIBERY LEGISLATION

Although the international community has only recently begun
to tackle foreign bribery,17 the United States started developing its
antibribery legislation more than 35 years ago. 18 In 1977, Congress
enacted the FCPA in response to an SEC investigation in which more
than four hundred U.S. companies admitted to illegal or questionable
payments to foreign officials totaling over $300 million.19 In doing so,
Congress set out to prevent the bribery of foreign officials and to
restore the public's faith in the integrity of American business. 20 In
1988, Congress feared that the legislation forced American companies
to operate at a significant disadvantage to foreign competitors. 21 As a
result, Congress amended the FCPA to exclude small denomination

See generally U.K. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE
16.
(2011) [hereinafter GUIDANCE], available at http://www.justice.gov.uk/downloads/
legislation/bribery-act-2010-guidance.pdf.
Bribery is defined as "the voluntary giving or receiving of anything of value
17.
in corrupt payment for an official act done or to be done or with the corrupt intent to
influence the action of a public official or of any other person professionally concerned
with the administration of public affairs." See BALLENTINE'S LAW DICTIONARY 174 (3d
ed. 1969).
18.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, LAY PERSON'S GUIDE: FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT 1 (2012) [hereinafter LAY PERSON'S GUIDE] (on file with author).
19.
Id.
20.
See id. (explaining that "Congress enacted the FCPA to bring a halt to the
bribery of foreign officials and to restore public confidence in the integrity of the
American business system").
21.
See id. at 2 (noting that the 1998 amendments were advanced partially
because Congress realized that American companies were being forced to compete with
"foreign companies who routinely paid bribes and, in some countries, were permitted to
deduct the cost of such bribes as business expenses on their taxes").
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nondiscretionary payments, known as facilitation payments. 22
Facilitation payments are nominal payments used to expedite the
performance of a routine, nondiscretionary action of a foreign
official.2 3 In an attempt to increase international cooperation in 1998,
the United States signed the Organization for Economic Co-Operation
and Development's Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign
Officials in International Business Transactions (OECD Antibribery
Convention).
Subsequently, Congress increased the FCPA's
jurisdiction to incorporate this new international agreement. 24
After the OECD Antibribery Convention, the United States
began to more proactively seek out and prosecute actions of foreign
bribery under the FCPA.25 In his analysis of FCPA enforcement
between 2000-2009, Professor Carl Pacini discovered a number of
important trends. 26 These trends highlight the importance of FCPA
compliance and the need for clarity in the coming years. Mr. Pacini's
study cogently quantifies the federal government's recent aggressive
enforcement regime. 27 The number of FCPA cases filed annually has
escalated considerably since 2004.28 Over 80 percent of case filings in
the decade ending in 2009 occurred between 2005 and 2009.29 In
2005, fourteen cases were initiated compared to sixty-seven in 2009.30
The federal government has also increased its willingness to file
criminal cases, 31 to bring cases against individuals, 32 and to seek
greater monetary sanctions.33 The broad nature of the FCPA has

22.
See Jon Jordan, The OECD's Call for an End to "Corrosive" Facilitation
Payments and the InternationalFocus on the Facilitation Payments Exception Under
the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 13 U. PA. J. Bus. L. 881, 893 (2011) (noting that
Congress set out the facilitation payment exception in the 1998 amendments).
23.
See LAY PERSON's GUIDE, supra note 18, at 4-5 (defining a permissible
facilitation payment).
24.
See International Anti-Bribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998, Pub. L.
No. 105-366, 112 Stat. 3302 (1998) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to
78dd-3, 78ff) (amending the FCPA); see also LAY PERSON's GUIDE, supra note 18, at 2
(stating that in 1998 the United States implemented legislation to ratify the OECD
Antibribery Convention, which the United States signed in 1997).
25.
See Pacini, supra note 12, at 553-56 (finding a distinct trend of increased
aggressiveness in SEC and DOJ enforcement efforts since 2000).
26.
See generally id.
27.
See id. (analyzing the DOJ and SEC enforcement campaigns for the years
2000-2009).
28.
See id. (noting the increase in FCPA enforcement after 2004).
29.
Id. at 553.
Id.
30.
31.
See id. (noting that the majority of cases that contributed to the rise in the
level of FCPA enforcement involved criminal cases brought by the DOJ).
32.
See id. (finding that in 2009 almost three times as many cases were
brought against individuals (50) than against corporations (17)).
33.
See id. at 554 (stating that "[b]oth total and mean monetary sanctions have
increased considerably" between 2000 and 2009).
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allowed U.S. enforcement agents to establish the United States as the
most aggressive prosecutor of international bribery. 34
In the past 15 years, the international community has taken
significant steps toward criminalizing the corruption of international
business transactions.3 5 Whether out of protectionist concerns, a fear
of imposing competitive disadvantages on domestic businesses, or
general indifference, no country had enacted a law similar to the
FCPA prior to 1997. In 1997, the OECD Antibribery Convention
changed this international acquiescence to bribery by obligating its
ratifying members to criminalize the act of bribing foreign officials. 36
In 2003, the United Nations began advocating for the criminalization
of specific conduct associated with bribery and the strengthening of
international enforcement. 37 As more countries address this global
issue, regional" and nongovernmental organizations3 9 are joining the
fight against international bribery.
However, international efforts to investigate and prosecute
bribery have significantly trailed that of the United States. 40 The
level of foreign bribery prosecutions differs greatly among the thirtynine member countries.4 1 The United States is the most aggressive
enforcer of foreign bribery4 2 with almost double the amount of cases

See HEIMANN & DELL, supra note 9 (stating that the United States
34.
continues to lead in foreign bribery prosecutions).
Since 1997, the OECD, the United Nations, and independent organizations
35.
have taken actions related to international corruption. See infra notes 40-42 and
accompanying text.
See Lawrence W. Newman, The New OECD Convention on Combating
36.
Bribery, N.Y. L.J., Mar. 29, 1999 at 29 ("The OECD Convention, in criminalizing active
corruption of officials of foreign countries by nationals of signatory states, serves to
strengthen and unify international opposition to corrupt practices.").
See United Nations Convention Against Corruption, G.A. Res. 58/4, U.N.
37.
Doc A/58/422 (Oct. 31, 2003) (intending to promote and strengthen measures to prevent
corruption).
38.
See Rollo C. Baker, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV.
647, 671-72 (2010) (discussing the broad anticorruption conventions established by the
European Union in 1997 and the African Union in 2006).
39.
See Kathleen M. Hamann et al., Developments in U.S. and International
Efforts to Prevent Corruption, 40 INT'L L. 417, 419-22 (2006) (summarizing the
antibribery efforts of various nongovernmental organizations such as The Corner
House, Global Witness, Trace, and Transparency International).
40.
See generally HEIMANN & DELL, supra note 9 (profiling the progress and
effectiveness of international antibribery legislation and enforcement via the eighth
annual progress report on the OECD Antibribery Convention by Transparency
International).
41.
See id. at 6 (categorizing seven member countries as having "active
enforcement," twelve as having "moderate enforcement," ten as having "little
enforcement," and eight as having "no enforcement").
See id. at 6-9 (recognizing the United States as the most aggressive
42.
country that exhibits "active enforcement" of antibribery laws). While accounting for
only 9.6 percent of the world's exports in 2011, the United States prosecuted 39 percent
and 40 percent of all foreign bribery cases in 2011 and 2010, respectively. See id. at 9
tbl.A (prosecuting 275 of a total of 708 worldwide cases in 2011 and prosecuting 227 of
a total of 564 worldwide cases in 2010). Additionally, the United States was responsible
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and investigations of any other member country. 4 3 Although the
payments of bribes from U.S. organizations are lower than the global
average, such payments remain significant and are proportionally
greater than other developed world powers, such as Germany and
France. 44 Despite heavy-handed enforcement, the pressure to pay
bribes remains strong on account of the pervasive belief within
organizations that business is often lost due to bribery committed by
a competitor. 4 5
Although the United Kingdom was an original ratifying member
of the OECD Antibribery Convention, 46 it did little to implement its
obligations for 10 years after its signing.4 7 Prior to the convention,
UK antibribery laws consisted of a few outdated statutes and various
common law convictions for bribery. 48 These statutes were
"inconsistent, anachronistic and inadequate to comply with the [UK's]
obligations" under the OECD Antibribery Convention.4 9
The United Kingdom took its first step toward true bribery
prevention in 2001 with the passage of the Anti-Terrorism, Crime
and Security Act.50 The legislation did little to modernize the United
Kingdom's antibribery legislation, despite criminalizing bribery
committed outside the United Kingdom,51 as it only applied to UK
for 39 percent and 45 percent of the current investigations of bribery in 2011 and 2010,
respectively. See id. (initiating 113 out of a total of 286 worldwide investigations in
2011 and initiating 106 out of a total of 234 worldwide investigations in 2010).
43.
See id. (providing data on the cases and investigations for the next most
aggressive enforcement country, Germany). In 2011, Germany had 176 total cases and
43 investigations underway. Comparatively, in 2011, the United States had 275 cases
and 113 investigations underway. Id.
44.
See Press Release, Ernst & Young LLP, supra note 4 (noting in an Ernst &
Young fraud survey that 15 percent of U.S. respondents reported at least one instance
of bribery or corruption in the last 2 years as compared to the global average of 24
percent and a 6 percent average for both Germany and France respectively).
45.
See David Hess & Cristie L. Ford, Corporate Corruption and Reform
Undertakings: A New Approach to an Old Problem, 41 CORNELL INT'L. L.J. 307, 313
(2008) ("Overall, in 2006, 44% of the managers of U.S.-based corporations surveyed
believed that they lost a contract due to bribery in the last five years and 20% believed
that the same had occurred in the last twelve months.").
46.
See generally Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, Dec. 17, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1 (entered into force
Feb. 15, 1999) (committing signatory OECD Antibribery Convention nations to
criminalize the bribing of foreign public officials).
47.
See generally Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24, § 109
(U.K.) (establishing the first UK antibribery legislation after the OECD Antibribery
Convention).
48.
These early twentieth century statutes consisted of the Public Bodies
Corrupt Practices Act 1889, the Prevention of Corruption Act 1906 and the Prevention
of Corruption Act 1916. See DAVID AARONBERG & NICHOLA HIGGINS, THE BRIBERY ACT

2010: ALL BARK AND NO BITE....?, 1, 1 (2010), available at http://www.15nbs.com/
library/the.bribery act_2010allbarkandno.bite.pdf (discussing the predecessors of
the Bribery Act).
49.

Id.

50.
51.

Anti-Terrorism, Crime and Security Act, 2001, c. 24,
See id. (addressing external acts of bribery).

§ 109

(U.K.).
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nationals. 52 Consequently, it was incapable of reaching any non-UK
national even if they resided within the United Kingdom. 53
The United Kingdom's failure to reform its antibribery laws and
to uphold its obligations under the OECD Antibribery Convention
received repeated and often harsh criticism from the OECD Working
Group on Bribery. 54 The United Kingdom's reputation was further
damaged when the UK Serious Fraud Office (SFO) failed to properly
investigate and prosecute illegal payments made to Saudi Arabian
officials by BAE Systems (BAE), one of the United Kingdom's biggest
arms manufacturers. 55 Only after the United States intervened to
impose FCPA sanctions was BAE forced to pay a $445 million fine for
providing hundreds of millions of dollars in bribes to foreign officials
to win defense contracts in Saudi Arabia and Hungary. 56
Under increasing international pressure, the United Kingdom
passed the Bribery Act on April 8, 2010.57 The Bribery Act repealed
earlier patchwork legislation and established a single, comprehensive
approach through the creation of four overlapping offenses: accepting
a bribe, requesting a bribe, bribing a foreign official, and failing to
prevent bribery by a commercial organization. 58 After some delay, the
Ministry of Justice released the statutorily mandated guidance on the

52.
53.
who is:

Id. § 109(1)(a).
Section 109(4) defines a national of the United Kingdom as an individual
(a) a British citizen, a British Dependent Territories citizen, a British
National (Overseas) or a British Overseas citizen,
(b) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 (c. 61) is a British
subject, or
(c) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act.

Id. § 109(4.
54.
See OECD to Conduct a Further Examination of UK Efforts Against
Bribery, supra note 15 (noting that, in both 2003 and 2005, the OECD Working Group
recommended that the United Kingdom adopt modern antibribery laws at the earliest
possible time and, in 2007, the group reaffirmed that it maintained serious concerns
about the state of UK antibribery laws).
55.
See James Sturcke, Serious Fraud Office Admits BAE Controversy Has
Been Damaging, THE GUARDIAN (June 27, 2007), http:/Iww.theguardian.com/
world/2007/jun/27/bae.saudiarabia (reporting that SFO Director, Robert Wardle, had
told Members of Parliament that Britain's reputation for fighting corruption was
probably damaged by dropping the investigation into BAE); see also OECD to Conduct
a Further Examination of UK Efforts Against Bribery, supra note 15 (recognizing the
suspension of the BAE investigation as a factor contributing to the OECD's concern
over the United Kingdom's ability to properly prosecute bribery under the laws existing
at the time).
56.
See BAE Settles Protracted,ControversialBribery Case with U.S. and U.K.
Authorities, MILLLER CHEVALIER, http://www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/Miller
ChevalierPublications?find=26504 (recognizing that the United States began its own
investigation in 2007 after the discontinuation of the UK investigation).
57.
See AARONBERG & HIGGINS, supra note 48 (discussing the passing of the
Bribery Act).
58.
See id. (discussing the legislation that predated the Bribery Act).
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act (Guidance) on March 30, 2011, and the Bribery Act became
enforceable on July 1, 2011.59
III. OVERVIEW

OF THE

FCPA

The FCPA prohibits two categories of conduct. The antibribery
provisions generally prohibit a payment or an offer to make a
payment to a foreign official in an attempt to obtain or retain
business. 60 In addition, the accounting provisions force any company
(domestic or foreign) whose securities are listed in the United States
to implement appropriate compliance controls and to establish and
maintain adequate business and financial records.6 1 The antibribery
provisions apply to a broader range of entities than the accounting
provisions because they apply to both issuers 62 and domestic
concerns, 63 while the accounting provisions are limited to issuers. 64
The 1998 amendments significantly expanded the FCPA's
jurisdiction to cover more intentional conduct and parties. Under the
current FCPA, issuers and domestic concerns may now be held liable
for prohibited conduct whether the conduct occurs within the
territory of the United States or abroad. 65 Foreign citizens and

59.
See Kevin LaCroix, U.K. Government Issues Bribery Act Guidance, Sets
Effective Date, THE D & 0 DIARY (Mar. 31, 2011), http://www.dandodiary.com/
201 1/03/articles/foreign-corrupt-practices-act/uk-government-issues-bribery-actguidance-sets-effective-date (discussing the release of the Guidance).
60.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, §§ 78dd-1 to
-3, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977); see also LAY PERSON's GUIDE, supra note 18, at 2 (explaining
that the antibribery provisions of the FCPA make it unlawful "to make a corrupt
payment to a foreign official for the purpose of obtaining or retaining business for or
with, or directing business to, any person").
61.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78m(b)(2)(A); see also LAY PERSON'S
GUIDE, supra note 18, at 2 (outlining which companies are required to meet the
accounting provisions of the FCPA).
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-1 (outlining prohibited foreign
62.
trade practices by issuers). An "issuer" is any company that has issued securities in the
United States or any company that is subject to the reporting requirements of the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934. LAY PERSON'S GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-2 (prohibiting domestic concerns
63.
from certain foreign trade practices). A "domestic concern" includes "any individual
who is a citizen, national, or resident of the United States" along with "any corporation,
partnership ... [or other business entity] which has its principal place of business in
the United States" or is organized under the laws of the United States. See Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-2(h)(1) (defining domestic concern as used within the
FCPA).
64.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78m (outlining provisions that apply to
issuers).
65.
Originally, the FCPA only had jurisdiction over conduct that utilized a
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §
78dd-1(g)(1) (providing alternative jurisdiction over issuers "irrespective of whether
such issuer or such officer, director employee, agent, or stockholder makes use of the
mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce"); see also Foreign
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companies also fall under the jurisdiction of the FCPA for acts
committed within the United States. 66
A. The Antibribery Provisions
The antibribery provisions cover a broad range of corrupt activity
beyond direct cash payments to government officials. Specifically, the
antibribery provisions prohibit covered parties from (1) corruptly
paying or offering to pay, (2) anything of value, (3) to a foreign
official, (4) with the purpose of obtaining, retaining, or directing
business to any person. 6 7
B. CorruptIntent
A payment must be made corruptly to violate the FCPA.68 The
FCPA does not define corruptly,69 but its inclusion ensures that the
payor intends to wrongly influence the recipient. Notably, an intent to
influence satisfies this requirement as the FCPA does not require
that the act be carried out or that the conduct establish the desired
outcome. 70 Courts have expanded this element to include anyone who
intentionally attempts to accomplish a bad purpose, including
unlawful results and the use of unlawful means.7 1 This element is an

Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-2(i)(1) (providing similar alternative jurisdiction over
domestic concerns).
Foreign citizens and corporations were originally only subject to the FCPA
66.
as issuers. See LAY PERSON'S GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3 (recognizing the original scope
of the FCPA). The 1998 amendments increased the jurisdictional reach of the FCPA by
extending jurisdiction over "any person" utilizing a means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-3. A foreign citizen may
further be subject to the FCPA for acts committed outside of the United States if they
are acting as an agent of a domestic concern. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-2.
67.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1 to -3, 78dd-2, 78dd-3
(highlighting prohibited conduct as applied to issuers, domestic concerns, and persons
other than issuers or domestic concerns).
68.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (requiring violators to
"corruptly" make payments).
69.
See S. REP. No. 95-114, at 10 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,
4100-01 (providing that the word corruptly was utilized to ensure that the conduct be
"intended to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully
direct business to the payor or his client, or to obtain preferential legislation or a
favorable regulation").
70.
See id. (stating that the FCPA does not require that the act be "fully
consummated, or succeed in producing the desired outcome"); see also LAY PERSON'S
GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3 (noting that there is no requirement in the FCPA that the
corrupt act succeed in its desired purpose).
71.
See Cyavash Nasir Ahmadi, Note, Regulating the Regulators: A Solution to
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Woes, 11 J. INT'L Bus. & L. 351, 357 (2012) (quoting
United States v. Liebo, 923 F.2d 1308, 1312 (8th Cir. 1991)) (explaining that the Eighth
Circuit upheld a jury instruction for convictions under the FCPA that defined a corrupt
act as an act that intentionally attempts to accomplish a bad purpose, which includes
both unlawful results and the use of unlawful means).
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important limitation on the scope of the FCPA as it is one of the few
elements that the SEC and DOJ cannot functionally evade. The
FCPA also requires that a defendant have knowledge that the
payments will be made for a corrupt or illegal purpose.7 2 However,
the 1998 amendments prevent an individual from avoiding the
knowledge that payments are going toward a corrupt purpose in an
attempt to circumvent this requirement.7 3
1.

Anything of Value

Illegal payments are not limited to monetary payments but
include any "offer, gift, promise to give, or authorization of the giving
of anything of value." 74 Certain cases, such as the Marubeni
Corporation's payment of over $50 million in bribes to Nigerian
officials to obtain government contracts, clearly qualify as an
exchange of value.75 However, both the DOJ and SEC have given this
phrase a far-reaching definition, encompassing items such as future
consideration, executive training programs, and the payment of
certain travel and medical expenses. 76 Moreover, the SEC has found
even intangible items, such as intangible benefits from a charitable
donation, to be a thing of value. 7 This all-inclusive definition

72.
See Robert A. Youngberg, A Guide to the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 18
UTAH BAR J. 22, 23-24 (2005) (discussing the scope of the knowledge requirement of
the FCPA and the expansion of the 1998 amendments to cover individuals who attempt
to avoid such knowledge).
73.
See id. (recognizing the expansion of this element after the 1998
amendments to cover individuals who attempt to avoid such knowledge).
74.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-1(a).
75.
See ROBERT W. TARUN, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT HANDBOOK:
A PRACTICAL GUIDE FOR MULTINATIONAL GENERAL COUNSEL, TRANSACTIONAL
LAWYERS AND WHITE COLLAR CRIMINAL PRACTITIONERS 7 (3d ed. 2013) (recognizing

that cash and equivalents are well understood to be within the meaning of the FCPA);
Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Marubeni Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to Pay a $54.6 Million Criminal Penalty (Jan.
17, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/opalpr/2012/January/12-crm-060.html
(discussing the DOJ's settlement with the Marubeni Corporation regarding bribery
allegations).
76.
See Amy Deen Westbrook, EnthusiasticEnforcement, Informal Legislation:
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 45 GA. L. REV 489, 538
(discussing the broad nature of the interpretation of the phrase anything of value). In
the related context of bribery of U.S. government officials, courts have similarly
broadly construed the term thing of value and consider an item to be of value as long as
the person receiving it subjectively attaches any value to the item. See United State v.
Gorman, 807 F.2d 1299, 1305 (6th Cir. 1986) ("[T]he focus of [the term thing of value] is
to be placed on the value which the defendant subjectively attaches to the items
received."). In United States v. Gorman, the Sixth Circuit found that both the extension
of a loan and also a noncontractual promise of future employment amounted to a thing
of value. Id.
77.
See Westbrook, supra note 76, at 539 (discussing the 2004 settlement of an
FCPA action against the Scherling-Plough Corporation for the payment of charitable
donations).
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provides the DOJ and SEC with unconstrained authority to prosecute
activities that most individuals would not consider bribery.
2.

Foreign Officia

78

The FCPA provides an expansive meaning to the term foreign
official.7 9 The FCPA is not concerned with an individual's rank or
position as it focuses on the corrupt purpose, not the ability of the
recipient to carry out the corrupt purpose.80 The FCPA's definition of
a foreign official covers direct employees of a foreign government and
those that exercise authority over government decisions and
contracts.8 1
Additionally, an officer or employee is considered a foreign
official if they work for an "instrumentality" of a foreign
government.8 2 The DOJ and SEC have interpreted instrumentality to
include employees of state-owned or state-controlled companies. 8
While willing to prosecute payments to employees of partially stateowned or state-managed entities, the DOJ and SEC have failed to
provide adequate guidance on the meaning of instrumentality of a
foreign government. 84 Even if the business is only partially
78.
The definition and scope of foreign official under the FCPA is a highly
nuanced and uncertain area within the FCPA. While various commentators have
addressed the development and expansion of the term foreign official, this complexity
is outside the scope of this Note. See Westbrook, supra note 76, at 531-38 (discussing
the expansive statutory interpretation given to the term foreign official). See generally
Court E. Golumbic & Jonathan P. Adams, The "DominantInfluence" Test: The FCPA's
"Instrumentality"and "ForeignOfficial" Requirements and the Investment Activity of
Sovereign Wealth Funds, 39 AM. J. CRIM. L. 1 (2011) (discussing the application of the
term foreign official as applied to sovereign wealth funds).
79.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 2(h)(2)(A), 3(f)(2)(A)
(defining foreign official as "any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such
government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such
public international organization").
80.
See LAY PERSON'S GUIDE, supra note 18, at 3 (recognizing the FCPA's focus
on the corrupt purpose).
81.
See id. (including any individual acting in an official capacity).
82.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 2(h)(2)(A), 3(f)(2)(A)
(defining foreign official as "any officer or employee of a foreign government or any
department, agency, or instrumentality thereof, or of a public international
organization, or any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such
government or department, agency, or instrumentality, or for or on behalf of any such
public international organization").
83.
See Joel M. Cohen, Michael P. Holland & Adam P. Wolf, Under the FCPA,
Who Is a Foreign Official Anyway?, 63 Bus. LAw. 1243, 1249-50 (discussing the DOJ
and SEC's interpretation of the term foreign official under the FCPA).
84.
See id. at 1250 ("[The DOJ and SEC have declined to provide guidance so
that companies may proactively determine whether their customers and business
partners are 'instrumentalities' of their respective governments."). While it is clear that
an entity need not be wholly owned by the government to be considered an
instrumentality, it is not clear exactly what level of government ownership or control is
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government owned or controlled, all officers, employees, and any
individual acting on behalf of an instrumentality of a foreign
government are considered a foreign official. 85 This ambiguously
broad definition imposes significant uncertainty upon employees and
companies as it is often difficult to ascertain whether they are
actually transacting with an instrumentality of a foreign
government. 86 This is especially challenging when dealing with
foreign governments that maintain significant control or ownership of
domestic businesses, such as China.87 While this definition of foreign
official is broad, it is still narrower than the definition recommended
by the OECD Antibribery Convention.8 8
3.

The Business Purpose Test

In order to qualify as illegal conduct, one must either secure an
improper advantage or assist in the retaining, obtaining, or directing
of business to any person.8 9 The DOJ and SEC have interpreted this
requirement broadly to include more than the obtaining or
continuation of a government contract.9 0 Moreover, the Fifth Circuit

required in order to convert a public business or entity into a government
instrumentality. Id.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1(f)(1)(A), 2(h)(2)(A), 3(f)(2)(A).
85.
See Cohen, Holland & Wolf, supranote 83, at 1250-54 (noting the confusion
86.
surrounding the DOJ and SEC's interpretation of the term instrumentality).
87.
See Eve Cary, Reforming China's State-Owned Enterprises,THE DIPLOMAT,
(June 19, 2013), available at http://thediplomat.com/2013/06/19/reforming-chinas-stateowned-enterprises/?all=true (recognizing the existence of "China's huge apparatus of
state-owned enterprises").
See Golumbic & Adams, supra note 78, at 12-13 (discussing the scope and
88.
definition of foreign official under the OECD Antibribery Convention). Specifically, the
OECD Antibribery Convention defined foreign official to include both individuals that
hold governmental offices within a country (judicial, administrative, and legislative)
and also "any person exercising a public function for a foreign country, including for a
public agency or public enterprise."Id. (emphasis in original). On account of the OECD
Antibribery Convention, part of the 1998 amendments added public international
organizations into the definition of foreign official. See id. (discussing the changes
implemented after the 1998 amendments). While Congress has expanded the scope of
foreign official on account of the OECD Antibribery Convention, Congress has not
incorporated the OECD Antibribery Convention's standards of ownership, which would
render an entity a public enterprise. See id. at 13 (noting Congress's response to the
OECD Antibribery Convention).
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-2(a)(1) (prohibiting the use of the
89.
mail for payments, offers to "any foreign official for purposes of ... securing any
improper advantage," or "obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing
business to, any person"). This requirement is commonly referred to as the business
purpose or business nexus test. The scope of this provision was extended during the
1998 amendments to include an improper advantage. See Youngsberg, supra note 72
(discussing the 1998 amendments to the FCPA).
See LAY PERSON'S GUIDE, supra note 18, at 4 (recognizing the broad
90.
interpretation of the business purpose test). Similarly, the Fifth Circuit, in United
States v. Kay, held that Congress intended the FCPA to address exchanges beyond
those that relate directly to a government contract. See 359 F.3d 738, 749 (5th Cir.
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noted that disadvantaging competitors has a "sufficient nexus" to an
entity's ability to obtain, maintain, conduct, or increase business in
the country, satisfying this element.9 1 Thereby, a transaction that has
a monetary savings or other positive impact will satisfy this
requirement.9 2 The advantage does not need to come directly from the
government or an instrumentality of the government as long as the
transaction occurs with a foreign official.9 3
4.

The Facilitating or Grease Payment Exception

Congress provided a limited exception to the antibribery
provisions to address the realities of the business environment in
foreign countries and to lessen the competitive disadvantage placed
upon American companies transacting abroad. 94 The difficulty of
competing with foreign institutions that may freely bribe without
facing corresponding liability was a great concern to both the U.S.
business community and Congress.95 Accordingly, the FCPA does not
explicitly apply to "any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign
official[,] .

.

. the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the

performance of a routine governmental action."96
While judicial rulings upon this exception are significantly
limited, courts that have dealt with this provision have focused their

2004) (pointing out that "the immorality, inefficiency, and unethical character of
bribery presumably does not vanish simply because the tainted payments are intended
to secure a favorable decision less significant than winning a contract bid").
91.
See Kay, 359 F.3d at 749 (recognizing that if the defendant's bribes
sufficiently lowered their costs of doing business in the country, then such actions
would satisfy the business nexus requirement).
92.
See id. (recognizing tax savings procured through bribery as sufficiently
linked to retaining business to meet the requirement).
93.
See LAY PERSON's GUIDE, supra note 18, at 4 (pointing out the lack of a
requirement for direct payment). Many improper advantages, such as the awarding of
government contracts or the reducing of custom's payments, come directly from the
government; yet, other advantages, such as an improper permit for a factory that fails
to meet a statutory requirement, create improper advantages (lower operating costs)
that come only indirectly from the government. See Kay, 359 F.3d at 747 (recognizing
that an unwarranted permit would amount to an improper advantage covered under
the FCPA).
94.
See Report, Committee on Fiscal Affairs to the OECD Council,
Implementation of the OECD Recommendations on the Deductibility of Bribes to
Foreign Public Officials (Apr. 28, 1998), available at http://www.oecd.org/daflbribery
ininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconventionlimplementationoftheoecd
(recognizing
recommendationonthetaxdeductibilityofbribestoforeignpublicofficials.htm
that prior to the OECD Antibribery Convention, many countries not only tolerated
bribes of foreign officials but also allowed companies to deduct such expenses for tax
purposes).
95.
See Emily N. Strauss, Note, "Easing Out" The FCPA FacilitationPayment
Exception, 93 B.U. L. REV. 235, 236 (2013) (noting that Congress recognized the
realities faced by many corporations doing business abroad when enacting the
facilitation payment exception).
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-1(b), 2(b), 3(b).
96.
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analysis on the lack of a foreign official's discretionary authority. In
United States v. Kay, the Fifth Circuit noted that Congress sought to
prevent bribery, which requires an official to abuse his governmental
position through the misuse of his discretionary authority.9 7 Unlike
bribery, facilitation payments are essentially ministerial actions that
move a governmental action toward a discretionary decision, but the
action itself is nondiscretionary.9 8 Although there is no statutory
limitation on the monetary value, general consensus is that
facilitation payments are under one thousand dollars.99
Additionally, the phrase routine governmental action limits the
breadth of this exception to an ordinary action of a foreign official.10 0
Without providing an exhaustive list, the statute offers specific
examples of routine actions. 10 ' The unifying characteristic of these
examples is that they amount to nondiscretionary actions foreign
officials perform during the normal course of fulfilling their duties.
5.

Affirmative Defenses:
Expenditures

Legal

Payments

and

Bona

Fide

The 1998 amendments to the FCPA established two affirmative
defenses.102 First, a payment or exchange is legal if it is "lawful under
the written laws and regulations" of the foreign country in which it
was made.10 3 The use of this defense is extremely rare as it requires
proof of an affirmative and written foreign law that specifically allows
the payment or gift.104 Neither customary practices nor prosecutorial

97.
See Kay, 359 F.3d at 747 (noting the importance of the use of a foreign
official's discretionary authority in order to constitute bribery).
See id. (relying upon the legislative history of the FCPA to define these
98.
terms as Congress did not provide for expressed textual exceptions).
See Arthur F. Matthews, Defending SEC and DOJ FCPA Investigations
99.
Triton
and Conducting Related Corporate Internal Investigations: The
Energy/IndonesiaSEC Consent Decree Settlements, 18 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 303, 315
(1998) (discussing the size of facilitation payments).
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1(f)(3), 2(h)(4), 3(f)(4)(A)
100.
(defining routine governmental action).
101.
See id. (providing that the following categories of activities may fall into a
routine governmental action: obtaining official documents to conduct business in the
country (permits, licenses, etc.); facilitating the processing of governmental papers
(visas and various work orders); and the providing of various services, including but
not limited to police protection, loading cargo, power and water, and scheduling of
inspections).
See Youngberg, supra note 72, at 25 (discussing the adoption of the
102.
affirmative defenses).
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1(c)(1), 2(c)(1), 3(c)(1) (defining
103.
requirements for the first affirmative defense).
104.
See LAY PERSON's GUIDE, supra note 18, at 5 (requiring a written law in
order for the defense to apply).
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acquiescence will suffice.10 5 Judicial construction of this defense is
infrequent and typically raises more questions than it answers. 10 6
Second, the FCPA does not prohibit a payment, gift, offer, or
promise of anything of value that is a reasonable "bona fide
expenditure."10 7 The foreign official must incur this expense, which
must be directly related to "(A) the promotion, demonstration, or
explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or
performance of a contract with a foreign government or agency
thereof." 0 8 An example of a reasonable and bona fide expenditure
would be payment for travel and lodging expenses.109

B. The Accounting Provisions
The accounting provisions represent Congress's response to
organizations that were using off-the-books slush funds to covertly
bribe foreign officials. 110 Specifically, the accounting provisions,
codified in 15 U.S.C § 78m(b)(2) and (b)(5), consist of two
requirements: an issuer must maintain (1) accurate records of
transactions concerning assets and (2) an appropriate system of
internal controls.111 These requirements apply to conduct outside the
context of bribery as they cover all record keeping.112 However, these
provisions only apply to issuers as defined by the Securities Exchange

105.
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-576, at 922 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1547,1955 (requiring proof of a written law in the country for the defense
to apply).
106.
See First Judicial Construction of the FCPA Local Law Administrative
Defense Raises More Questions than it Answers, STEPTOE & JOHNSTON LLP (Nov. 14,
2008) http://www.steptoe.com/publications-5743.html (noting that a recent judicial
opinion "raised more questions than it answered - and provided little useful guidance
to corporations").
107.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 2(c)(2), 3(c)(2) (defining
requirements for the second affirmative defense).
108.
Id.
109.
Id. In practice, the exception is very limited. For example, while travel
expenses may be considered a bona fide expenditure, such payments are also often
considered impermissible if they provide any personal benefit or convenience to the
foreign official. See Westbrook, supra note 76, at 538 (discussing the overly broad
nature of the interpretation of the phrase anything of value).
110.
See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 1-2 (1977), reprinted in 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4098,
4100-01 (discussing the history of the amendment bill, including the existence of
"undisclosed[,] questionable or illegal corporate payments").
111.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78m(b)(2), (b)(5) (defining issuer
reporting requirements).
112.
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N, A RESOURCE GUIDE
TO THE U.S. FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT, 38 (2012) [hereinafter THE GUIDE]
(noting that not only do the accounting provisions address bribery but they are also the
basis for most disclosure and accounting fraud cases pursued by the SEC and DOJ). In
this aspect, the accounting provisions have a wide reach as they apply regardless of
whether a company conducts foreign business. Id. at 42-43 (discussing civil liability for
issuers, affiliates, and subsidiaries).
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Act of 1934, meaning the provisions have a narrower scope than the
far-reaching antibribery provisions.
1.

The Books and Records Provision"i3

The books and records provision attempts to prevent the
concealment of improper payments in a company's books by
concealing such payments as legitimate business expenses. The DOJ
and SEC recognize that there are nearly infinite possibilities
available to companies to mischaracterize bribes.1 14 For example, a
company may falsely record a bribe as any number of legitimate
business expenses, such as petty cash withdrawals, sales
commissions, or consulting fees." 5
Specifically, the books and records provision mandates that
issuers "make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in
reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and
dispositions of the assets of the issuer."116 This provision has three
objectives: (1) making unlawful any act resulting in inaccurate
financial records; (2) ensuring that transactions are recorded
according to accepted methods of reporting; and (3) providing records
that reflect a transaction such that financial statements may be
produced in conformity with Generally Accepted Accounting
Principles and other standards.1 1 7

113.
The books and records provision is the common term used to refer to 15
U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A). See THE GUIDE, supra note 112, at 39 ("Section 13(b)(2)(A) of the
Exchange Act (15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A)) . . . [is] commonly called the 'books and
records' provision).").114.
See THE GUIDE, supra note 112, at 39 (acknowledging in their 2012
guidance on the FCPA that the DOJ and SEC have seen bribes mischaracterized as:
"Commissions or Royalties, Consulting Fees, Sales and Marketing Expenses, Scientific
Incentives or Studies, Travel and Entertainment Expenses, Rebates or Discounts, After
Sales Service Fees, Miscellaneous Expenses, Petty Cash Withdrawals, Free Goods,
Intercompany Accounts, Supplier/Vendor Payments, Write-offs, and 'Customs
Intervention' Payments").
115.
See id. (discussing specific examples of bribe mischaracterizations).
116.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78m(b)(7) (defining reasonabledetail as
a 'level of detail and degree of assurance as would satisfy prudent officials in the
conduct of their own affairs").
117.
In SEC v. World-Wide Coin Invs., Ltd., 567 F. Supp. 724, 748 (N.D. Ga.
1983) the court found that the books and records provision has:
three basic objectives: (1) books and records should reflect transactions in
conformity with accepted methods of reporting economic events, (2)
misrepresentation, concealment, falsification, circumvention, and other
deliberate acts resulting in inaccurate financial books and records are
unlawful, and (3) transactions should be properly reflected on books and
records in such a manner as to permit the preparation of financial statements
in conformity with GAAP and other criteria applicable to such statements.
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There are a few notable aspects of this provision. Reasonable
detail" 8 serves as the qualifying term of this provision. Congress and
the courts have noted that this provision does not require a level of
exact precision,1 19 instead the level of accuracy necessary will vary
with the nature of the transaction. 120 However, no materiality
threshold exists in order for an inaccurately recorded transaction to
breach this provision.' 2 ' Finally, although not specifically defined,
books, records, and accounts have received very broad and potentially
all encompassing definitions. 2 2
2.

The Internal Controls Provision

The FCPA internal controls provision requires issuers to
maintain a system of internal accounting controls.1 23 Neither the
FCPA nor the SEC explains how to determine an adequate system of
controls, nor do they mandate the implementation of specific
controls.1 24 Similar to the books and records provision, the FCPA
applies the reasonableness requirement.125

118.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78m(b)(7) (defining reasonabledetail).
119.
See THE GUIDE, supra note 112, at 39 ("[A]s Congress noted when it
adopted this definition, '[t]he concept of reasonableness of necessity contemplates the
weighing of a number of relevant factors, including the costs of compliance."'); see also
World-Wide Coin Invs., 567 F. Supp. at 749 (noting the numerous objections to the
requirement that records be "accurate").
120.
See World-Wide Coin Invs., 567 F. Supp. at 749 (noting that the accuracy
requirement requires "conformity with accepted methods of recording economic events"
and not "exact precision as measured by some abstract principle").
121.
See THE GUIDE, supra note 112, at 39 (noting that the inaccurate recording
of any payment is enough for an issuer to be in violation of the provision).
122.
See World-Wide Coin Invs., 567 F. Supp. at 748-49 (explaining that the
broad definition may be such that it is possible that "virtually any tangible
embodiment of information made or kept by an issuer is within the scope" of the books
and records provision).
Section 78m(b)(2)(B) of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act prescribes that
123.
this system of controls must
provide reasonable assurances that - (i) transactions are executed in
accordance with management's general or specific authorization; (ii)
transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation of financial
statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting principles or any
other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to maintain accountability
for assets; (iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with
management's general or specific authorization; and (iv) the recorded
accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable
intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act § 78m(b)(2)(B).
124.
See id. (prescribing what assurances an organization's system of controls
must provide but not mandating any specific forms of control).
See id. § 78m(b)(7) (providing the same definition for both reasonable
125.
assurances used in the internal controls provision and reasonable detail used in the
books and record provision).
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Overall, the importance of company-specific risks requires that
this provision remain open-ended to provide flexibility. Generally, the
nature of an organization's business and the risks inherent in its
operations will drive the design and implementation of its system of
controls.126 To be effective, a compliance program must be tailored to
meet company-specific risks.127 While not legally binding, the terms
of DOJ and SEC settlement agreements help to establish a common
law of FCPA compliance best practices. 128
IV. ANTIBRIBERY LAW IN THE UNITED KINGDOM: BRIBERY ACT

2010

Although the United Kingdom signed the original OECD
Antibribery Convention 16 years ago,1 29 the enactment of the Bribery
Act represents the United Kingdom's first meaningful effort to
address foreign bribery. Prior to the Bribery Act, legislative
indifference caused the United Kingdom to gain a reputation as being
soft on bribery.13 0 The Bribery Act replaced existing UK laws by
creating three main offenses: (1) bribing another person; (2) accepting
a bribe; and (3) bribing a foreign official.' 3 ' Additionally, the Bribery
Act established a far-reaching strict liability offense that criminalizes
a commercial organization's failure to prevent bribery done on their
behalf. 132

126.
See THE GUIDE, supra note 112, at 40 (noting the importance of risk
assessments in regard to high risk regions and businesses).
127.
An effective system of internal controls will include a wide variety of
components, potentially covering: (1) the overall tone and importance placed upon
integrity and ethics by the corporation, (2) information, communication, and
monitoring procedures, (3) policies designed to effectively ensure management
directives are implemented, (4) risk assessment procedures to uncover high risk
regions or businesses, (5) internal disciplinary systems, (6) employee training and
education, and (7) proper violation reporting procedures. See id. (discussing
components of typical internal control systems).
128.
See, e.g., Plea Agreement at 10, United States v. Siemens
Aktiengesellschaft, No. 1:08-CR-00367-RJL (D.C. Cir. Dec. 15, 2008), available at
http://www.justice.gov/criminallfraud/fcpa/cases/siemens/12-15-08siemensakt-plea.pdf
(requiring Siemens AG to implement an outside monitoring firm for 4 years as a
condition of settlement).
129.
See generally Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials
in International Business Transactions, supra note 46.
130.
See Bribery Laws 'Shameful', Say MPs, BBC NEWS (Apr. 4, 2001)
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hiluk-news/politics/1259957.stm
(discussing the perceived
inadequacies of the UK antibribery legislation).
131.
See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, §§ 1, 2, 6 (U.K.) (setting forth new antibribery
crimes).
132.
See id. § 7 (providing for an organizational strict liability offense).
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A. Giving or Receiving Bribes: § 1 and § 2 Offenses
Combined, § 1 and § 2 of the Bribery Act cover an individual
making (§ 1 offenses) or receiving (§ 2 offenses) a bribe.' 33 These
sections apply to individuals regardless of whether they are acting in
their individual capacity or on behalf of an organization.134
Section 1 makes it illegal to offer, promise, or give-either
directly or through a third party or agent13 5-a financial or other
advantage to another person when (1) the exchange intends to induce
or reward the "improper performance" of a "relevant function" or (2)
where the offeror knows or believes that acceptance of the exchange
itself would amount to an improper performance of such function.136
Section 1 is not limited to monetary bribes, nor does it require actual
payment as an offer constitutes an offense.' 3 7 A relevant function
entails the actions of public officials, including acts taken in
conjunction with private business and acts done in the course of one's
employment that arise to a position of trust. 3 8 An act or omission
related to such function is performed improperly if it breaches the
relevant expectations of a reasonable person in the United Kingdom
without consideration for any local custom or practice absent written
local law.' 3 9 An individual must in good faith respect a position of
trust.140

Section 2 of the Bribery Act concerns the potential recipient of
the bribe (or a third party acting at their request)14 1 who requests,
agrees to receive, or accepts a financial or other advantage in one of
four different situations. 142 All aspects of § 1 offenses are similarly
applied to § 2 offenses. 143

133.
See id. §§ 1-2 (defining liability for individuals making or receiving bribes).
See id. (extending liability to exchanges in which the individual making or
134.
receiving a bribe is not the ultimate beneficiary of the transaction).
135.
See id. § 1(5) ("[I]t does not matter whether the advantage is offered,
promised or given by [a person] directly or through a third party.").
136.
See id. §§ 1(2)-(3) (making it an offense to offer, promise, or give an
advantage when that advantage is intended to induce an improper performance, as
well as when the acceptance of such an advantage would itself be an improper
performance).
137.
See id. (making it an offense to give, promise, or offer a "financial or other
advantage").
138.
Id. §4(2).
139.
See id. §§ 4-5 (defining the Act's "expectation test").
140.
See GUIDANCE, supra note 16, at 10 (explaining that 'improper
performance' . . . means performance which amounts to a breach of an expectation that
a person will act in good faith, impartially, or in accordance with a position of trust").
141.
See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 2(5)(b) (identifying third-party recipients as
covered under the Bribery Act).
142.
See id. § 2 (setting forth the situations in which an individual improperly
receives a bribe). In its entirety, Section 2 of the Bribery Act states:
(1) A person ("R") is guilty of an offence if any of the following cases applies.
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B. Bribery of ForeignPublic Officials: § 6 Offenses
Like the FCPA, § 6 of the Bribery Act addresses payments made
to a foreign official. An individual may not offer, promise, or give any
financial or other advantage to a foreign official if the individual
intends to (1) obtain or retain business or a related advantage and (2)
influence the foreign public official in their official capacity.' 4 4 The
Bribery Act provides an expansive definition of foreign public official
that includes anyone who holds an administrative, judicial, or
legislative position outside of the United Kingdom, as well as
individuals who exercise a public function for a foreign government,
public agency, or public international organization.145

(2) Case 3 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other
advantage intending that, in consequence, a relevant function or activity
should be performed improperly (whether by R or another person).
(3) Case 4 is where(a) R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other advantage,
and
(b) the request, agreement or acceptance itself constitutes the improper
performance by R of a relevant function or activity.
(4) Case 5 is where R requests, agrees to receive or accepts a financial or other
advantage as a reward for the improper performance (whether by R or another
person) of a relevant function or activity.
(5) Case 6 is where, in anticipation of or in consequence of R requesting,
agreeing to receive or accepting a financial or other advantage, a relevant
function or activity is performed improperly(a) by R, or
(b) by another person at R's request or with R's assent or acquiescence.
(6) In cases 3 to 6 it does not matter(a) whether R requests, agrees to receive or accepts (or is to request,
agree to receive or accept) the advantage directly or through a third
party,
(b) whether the advantage is (or is to be) for the benefit of R or another
person.
(7) In cases 4 to 6 it does not matter whether R knows or believes that the
performance of the function or activity is improper.
(8) In case 6, where a person other than R is performing the function or
activity, it also does not matter whether that person knows or believes that the
performance of the function or activity is improper.
Id.
143.
Section 2 bribes are not limited to either cash or monetary payments, nor
does the bribe need to be completed as a request alone may be enough to complete the
offense. Id. Additionally, the same definitions of relevant functions and improper
performance apply similarly to § 2. Id. §§ 3-4.
144.
Id. §§ 6(1)-(3).
145.
Id. § 6(5).
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While § 6 exists as a standalone offense, § 1 and § 6 often capture
the same conduct but in different ways.146 The Ministry of Justice has
indicated that the inclusion of § 6 removes the requirement of proving
an improper performance on account of the inherent evidentiary
difficulties concerning foreign officials. 14 7
C. Failureof Commercial Organizationsto Prevent
Bribery: § 7 Offenses
Section 7 applies strict liability to "relevant commercial
organizations" if a "person associated" with the organization bribes
another person to obtain business or a related advantage. 148
Consequently, a qualifying organization will be liable for any action
taken by an associated person that meets the requirements of § 1 or §
6.149 The expansive definitions provided for associated person and
relevant commercial organizations,which are unique to § 7, grant this
provision broader jurisdiction than the rest of the Bribery Act.
The definition for an associated person includes anyone who
performs services on behalf of the organization 5 0-the Bribery Act
does not focus on the capacity in which a person serves the
organization. 151 This comprehensive definition was intended "to
embrace the whole range of persons connected to an organization who
might be capable of committing bribery on the organization's
behalf." 52 Thus, this overly broad classification encompasses more
than employees, agents, and subsidiaries, it also includes contractors,
suppliers, and other members of an organization's supply chain.' 53
The definition of relevant commercial organizations further
extends § 7's extraterritorial reach. While § 1, § 2, and § 6 of the
Bribery Act govern actions occurring in foreign territories, these
sections are limited to UK entities or those with a close connection to
the United Kingdom.154 Conversely, while clearly covering UK-based
entities, § 7 does not require a close connection to the United

See GUIDANCE, supra note 16, 1 23, at 11 (noting that the conduct targeted
146.
by § 6 may include activity that constitutes "improper performance" for the purposes of
§ 1).
147.
See id. (recognizing that the legislature was attempting to "formulate the
offense to take account of the evidential difficulties").
148.
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(1).
149.
See id. (Section 7 offenses cover conduct addressed under § 1 and § 6).
150.
Id. § 8(1).
37, at 16 (discussing the
151.
Id. §§ 8(2)-(4); see GUIDANCE, supra note 16,
Bribery Act's focus on all of the relevant circumstances of the relationship between the
individual and the organization).
152.
GUIDANCE, supra note 16, 37, at 16 (emphasis added).
37-39, at 17 (noting the possibility of including such entities
153.
See id.
within the scope of an associatedperson as defined by the Bribery Act).
154.
See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 12(1) ("An offence is committed under section
1, 2 or 6 in England and Wales, Scotland or Northern Ireland if any act or omission
which forms part of the offence takes place in that part of the United Kingdom.").
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Kingdom. Accordingly, for § 7 to apply to an organization, it must
simply carry on any part of its business in the United Kingdom.1 55
This lack of a territorial emphasis will impose § 7 upon many non-UK
entities, some of which may have only tangential contact with the
United Kingdom. Furthermore, the Ministry of Justice's Guidance
provides little insight into what organizations qualify under this
provision. 156 As a result, UK courts will eventually define the scope of
this provision themselves.
However, § 7 does contain a complete affirmative defense based
on an organization's compliance procedures.' 5 7 Since § 7 requires no
intent or knowledge on behalf of the organization, if an associated
person's action constitutes a bribe, then the organization will be liable
unless it can establish this sole defense.15 8
The required procedures are not specified in the Bribery Act.
Instead, § 9 mandates that the UK Secretary of State publish
guidance concerning such procedures.15 9 Regrettably, this Guidance
fails to provide any bright-line rules but simply sets forth six flexible,
nonprescriptive principles that should inform a commercial
organization's antibribery procedures. 160 While each principle
contains both commentary and potentially applicable procedures, in
aggregate these principles amount to an application of the same
common sense yet highly ambiguous standards used to determine the
initial applicability of § 7. Functionally, the Guidance amounts to a
requirement that the procedures be "proportionate to [the] risk" an
organization faces.161 Importantly, the Guidance notes that the onus
remains on the organization to establish the adequacy of their
procedures under a court's fact-specific inquiry.162

155.
See id. § 7(5) (defining a relevant commercial organization as any
partnership or corporation that "carries on a business, in any part of the United
Kingdom").
156.
See GUIDANCE, supra note 16,
35-36, at 15 (providing exclusively for a
common sense approach under which a "demonstrable business presence" would be
considered enough for an organization to qualify under § 7).
157.
See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) (describing possible defenses for
commercial organizations).
158.
See GUIDANCE, supra note 16, 11, at 8 (stating that § 7 provides for a full
defense by way of the existence of adequate procedures).
159.
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 9(1); see generally GUIDANCE, supra note 16
(highlighting that § 9's required guidance was included as part of the Bribery Act
Guidance published in March 2011).
160.
The six principles consist of proportionate procedures, top-level
commitment, risk assessment, due diligence, communication, and monitoring and
review. See id. at 21-31 (setting forth each principle and their accompanying
commentary).
161.
Id. at 20.
162.
See id. 1 4, at 6 (requiring that the courts conduct a factual inquiry into the
organization's specific cirucmstances as the Guidance is incapable of making such a
fact specific determination).
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Considering the lack of clarity as to what courts will consider
adequate procedures, a non-UK company's best defense may be to
ensure that they do not fall within the jurisdiction of § 7. While this
may be impossible for countless business or logistical reasons, in
order to avoid inclusion within § 7, a company must operate in a way
that avoids "a close connection" to the United Kingdom and does not
carry on any part of its business in the United Kingdom.163

V. COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS: THE FCPA AND THE BRIBERY ACT 2010

The framework, scope, and controlling provisions of the FCPA
and the Bribery Act have many commonalities. Both pieces of
legislation share the goal of preventing bribes to foreign officials, and
many related provisions possess similar scope and meaning.
However, these pieces of legislation differ in material ways.
These differences are important to consider even for organizations
incorporated and based in the United States for three main reasons:
(1) the scope and jurisdictional reach of § 7 of the Bribery Act makes
it likely that it will apply to many U.S.-based organizations; (2) the
Bribery Act will serve as the de facto regulation when its provisions
are broader than those in the FCPA; and (3) the uncertainty
concerning various provisions of the Bribery Act provide prosecutors
with significant discretion to pursue claims that would not be brought
under the FCPA.
A. JurisdictionalReach
The Bribery Act expanded the jurisdictional reach of the United
Kingdom's antibribery legislation in two significant ways. First, the
Bribery Act extended liability for acts committed outside of the
United Kingdom to individuals who are not UK nationals.1 64 This was
accomplished through the Bribery Act's close connection to the UK
test.165 This requirement makes it illegal for anyone considered to

163.
See supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
164.
See supra text accompanying notes 43-44 (explaining that prior to the
Bribery Act, UK antibribery laws failed to reach beyond UK nationals).
165.
The Bribery Act specifies that a person has a close connection with the
United Kingdom if they meet any of the following criteria:
(a) a British citizen,
(b) a British overseas territories citizen,
(c) a British National (Overseas),
(d) a British Overseas citizen,
(e) a person who under the British Nationality Act 1981 was a British
subject,
(f) a British protected person within the meaning of that Act,
(g) an individual ordinarily resident in the United Kingdom,
(h) a body incorporated under the law of any part of the United Kingdom,
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have a close connection to the United Kingdom to bribe another
individual, accept a bribe, or bribe a foreign official (§ 1, § 2, and § 6,
respectively). 166 This extension of jurisdictional reach is similar but
less broad than the 1998 amendments to the FCPAl 67 that extended
FCPA jurisdiction to anyone utilizing a means or instrumentality of
interstate commerce. Unlike the comprehensive jurisdiction of the
FCPA, the close connection test of the Bribery Act only extends
jurisdiction over residents of the United Kingdom and organizations
incorporated under its laws.
Despite the relatively constricted scope of § 1, § 2, and § 6, § 7 of
the Bribery Act exhibits a significantly wider extraterritorial reach.
In addition to businesses incorporated within the United Kingdom,
§ 7 extends its jurisdiction to any entity that "carries on a business or
part of a business, in any part of the United Kingdom."*6 8 Thus, § 7
effectively covers most international organizations within its
jurisdiction and all persons associated with those organizations.
Conversely, the FCPA does not cover the actions of foreign
organizations acting outside of the United States unless the
organization avails itself of the United States' public markets.1 69
Furthermore, the FCPA does not include a strict liability provision
comparable to § 7. While the accounting provisions of the FCPA and §
7 of the Bribery Act both encourage internal controls, far from the
extraterritorial approach of § 7, the jurisdiction of the FCPA's
accounting provisions are narrower than the FCPA's antibribery
provisions.1 70
While the extraterritorial breadth of the FCPA is statutorily
limited, § 7 of the Bribery Act arguably provides the United
Kingdom's SFO with jurisdiction to pursue actions taken in a foreign
territory by any individual associated with an organization as long as
the organization avails itself of any part of the UK economy.' 7 ' While

(i) a Scottish partnership.)
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, §§ 12(1)-(4).
166.
See id. §§12(2)(c), 12(3) (establishing liability for acts committed outside of
the United Kingdom as long as an individual has a close connection to the United
Kingdom).
167.
Included within the 1998 amendments to the FCPA was the addition of the
phrase any person, thereby extending the jurisdictional reach of the statute. Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-3.
168.
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, §§ 7(5)(b), (d).
169.
Availing oneself to U.S. markets makes one an issuer under the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 and thereby under the jurisdiction of the FCPA. See Foreign
Corrupt Practices Act § 78dd-1.
170.
See supra text accompanying notes 62-66 (discussing the jurisdictional
reach of the antibribery and accounting provisions of the FCPA).
171.
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 12(5) ("An offence is committed under section 7
irrespective of whether the acts or omissions which form part of the offence take place
in the United Kingdom or elsewhere.").
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the Guidance suggests a potentially more narrow application,1 72 SFO
Director Richard Alderman has made statements that directly
conflict with such a limited scope. Mr. Alderman views the Bribery
Act as applicable to organizations that "have some business within
the UK' even if the actionable "corruption has no connection with
that business presence."17 3 Since the Guidance is neither law nor
restrictive upon the SFO, the Bribery Act may significantly expand
liability beyond current FCPA liability.
B. Corrupt Element
The Bribery Act requires an actor to act with the intent to
influence a foreign official in his or her official capacity. 174 However,
unlike the FCPA, the mens rea requirement does not include corrupt
intent as an element. As discussed in Part II, 175 in order for a
payment to be illegal under the FCPA, an actor must have the
corrupt intent to improperly provoke or encourage the foreign official
to misuse their position to direct business or a benefit to the payor.176
While § 4 of the Bribery Act imposes the improper performance test
on the giving and receiving of bribes (§ 1 and § 2, respectively), this
requirement does not apply to §.6.
The lack of a corrupt intent requirement for § 6 offenses reflects
the United Kingdom's concerns over the evidentiary difficulties of
establishing such improper performance concerning a foreign public
official.' 7 7 Nonetheless, the Guidance recognizes that "it is not the
Government's intention to [criminalize behavior] where no such
mischief occurs." 17 8 Some commentators have suggested that this
means an additional intent requirement could be read into this
offense. 179 While possible, courts have yet to impose such a
requirement, and this suggestion is at odds with the Guidance's

172.
See GUIDANCE, supra note 16, T 36, at 15 (providing that listing on the
London Stock Exchange or a UK subsidiary alone may not, by itself, establish one as a
"relevant commercial organization").
173.
Richard Alderman, Dir., Serious Fraud Office, Bribery Act 2010 - A New
Beginning (Oct. 13, 2010), available at http://www.sfo.gov.uk/about-us/our-views/
director%27s-speeches/speeches-2010/lawyers-in-commerce--industry-in-associationwith-mayer-brown.aspx.
174.
See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 6(1) (describing the necessary intent for
bribery of foreign public officials).
175.
See Part III.A.1.
176.
See supra text accompanying notes 59-60.
177.
See GUIDANCE, supra note 16, T 23, at 11 (recognizing that the legislature
was attempting to "formulate the offense to take account of the evidential difficulties").

178.

Id.

179.
See Jacqueline L. Bonneau, Combating Foreign Bribery: Legislative Reform
in the United Kingdom and Prospects for Increased Global Enforcement, 49 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 365, 403 (2011) (suggesting that an intent requirement will be read into
the foreign bribery offense as it is applied).
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emphasis on prosecutorial discretion.1 80 The Guidance provides an
overarching directive that the government utilize its significant
prosecutorial discretion and carefully consider the public interest
when deciding to prosecute actions that facially trigger a provision of
the Bribery Act. 181 This lack of a corrupt intent element allows for far
greater prosecutorial discretion. If this is the case, individuals and all
organizations associated with that individual may be liable for
legitimate business expenses in which they possessed no intent to
improperly influence a foreign official.
The allocation of significant prosecutorial discretion has the
potential to subject international organizations to vast uncertainty
concerning their Bribery Act liability, similar to the uncertainty
surrounding FCPA liability. Although dormant for many years, the
discretion provided for in the FCPA enabled the DOJ and SEC to
implement their recent, aggressive enforcement campaign.182 The
DOJ and SEC have used their discretion to apply increasingly
expansive definitions to almost every aspect of the FCPA.18 In fact,
due to the enforcement theories of the DOJ and SEC, businesses may
be prosecuted for payments explicitly exempt from the FCPA.184 As a
result, one practitioner has warned that organizations "need to
anticipate that the SEC is going to pursue any legal theory that it
feels is remotely supportable. To some extent, you have to expect the
unexpected."185
While this aggressive enforcement in the United States does not
mean that UK regulators will similarly utilize their discretion to
expand the Bribery Act, the DOJ's and SEC's use of prosecutorial
discretion demonstrates the inherent risk of such discretion.
Moreover, the SFO has already utilized its discretion to interpret
sections of the Bribery Act broadly.186 When combined with the strict
liability aspect of § 7, international organizations could face liability

180.
See GUIDANCE, supra note 16,
49-51, at 19 (providing the scope and
application of prosecutorial discretion).
See id. (providing the scope and application of prosecutorial discretion).
181.
182.
See supra text accompanying notes 23-28.
See supra Part II.A.I (discussing the broad interpretation of corrupt
183.
intent); see supra Part III.A.2 (discussing how the interpretation of anything of value
extends as far as indirect intangible benefits); see supra Part III.A.3 (discussing the
expansive treatment of who qualifies as a foreign official); see supra Part III.A.4
(discussing the application of the business purpose test to cover more than the
awarding or maintaining of government contracts).
184.
See Mike Koehler, Big, Bold, and Bizarre: The Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act Enters a New Era, 43 U. TOL. L. REV. 99, 122-24 (2011) (summarizing numerous
FCPA enforcement actions that amount to the prosecution of payments that would
likely qualify as facilitation payments under the FCPA).
185.
See Amy Deen Westbrook, Enthusiastic Enforcement, Informal Legislation:
The Unruly Expansion of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 45 GA. L. REV. 489, 531
(2011) (quoting Yin Wilczek, Recent Cases Show SEC's Creative Use of Existing Law to
Widen Enforcement Reach, 41 SEC. REG. & L. REP. (BNA) 34, at 1583 (2009)).
186.
See supra text accompanying notes 145-46.
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through the actions of an employee or otherwise associated person,
even though that individual had no intent to bribe a foreign official.
C. FacilitationPayments
One major divergence of the Bribery Act from the FCPA is the
absence of an exception for facilitation payments. The FCPA excludes
nondiscretionary, low denomination payments from triggering
liability when specific criteria are met. 187 This exclusion focuses
enforcement upon actions in which an organization gains a
competitive advantage. 188
Conversely, in response to the OECD calling for the removal of
all such exceptions, the Bribery Act explicitly bans all payments,
including facilitation payments.' 8 9 Despite the relatively small size of
these payments, the drafters of the Bribery Act recognized the
negative implications of allowing these payments, most notably the
difficulty of enforcing such an artificial distinction. 190 Although
specifically noting that small facilitation payments will remain
prohibited under the Bribery Act, UK officials have stated that the
likelihood of being prosecuted for such a payment is remote.19 1 While
the likelihood of the SFO pursuing an individual facilitation payment
is low, these payments remain illegal and may be uncovered and
pursued during the course of an investigation. SFO officials have
publically stated that SFO investigations may consider such
payments in the aggregate and an organization may not escape
prosecution simply because it limits illegal payments to small
onetime payments that fail to collectively amount to a certain
value. 19 2
187.
See supra Part III.A.5 (providing a more in depth discussion of the
facilitation or grease payment exception provided for by the FCPA).
188.
See Kay, 359 F.3d at 747 (noting the importance of the use of a foreign
official's discretionary authority in order to constitute an actionable bribery offense
since nondiscretionary acts provide no benefit to the "bribing" party compared to its
compeditors).
44-45, at 18 (discussing the 2009 OECD
189.
See GUIDANCE, supra note 16,
recommendation that recognized the "corrosive effect of facilitation payments" and the
OECD request that "adhering countries [I discourage companies from making such
payments").
190.
Id. 1 45, at 18 (recognizing also that a facilitation payment exception
"undermine[s]
corporate
anti-bribery
procedures,
confuse[s]
anti-bribery
communication with employees and other associated persons, perpetuate[s)] an
existing 'culture' of bribery, and [has] the potential to be abused").
See Alderman, supra note 173, at 2 (clarifying the illegality of facilitation
191.
payments although recognizing that "the chances of the SFO prosecuting a small (say
$50) one off facilitation payment that is picked up and remedied by a corporate's (sic)
internal processes are remote").
192.
See Richard Kovalevsky & Barry Vitou, The Bribery Act, Facilitation
Payments & the Burning Questions: Practical SFO Guidance, THEBRIBERYACT.cOM
(Oct. 22, 2010, 3:22 PM), http://thebriberyact.com/2010/10/22/the-bribery-act(quoting Richard
facilitation-payments-the-burning-questions-practical-sfo-guidance/
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D. Compliance Programsand the Adequate ProceduresDefense
Perhaps the largest deviation from the FCPA is the United
Kingdom's adoption of an adequate procedures defense. Under the
Bribery Act, an organization may establish a complete defense by
demonstrating that they designed and maintained adequate
procedures to prevent bribery by associated people.' 9 3 The Ministry of
Justice has published the Guidance concerning the adequate
procedures defense; however, this Guidance remains vague and
unclear. Because the Guidance is not binding law, it is currently
uncertain whether existing FCPA compliance programs will be
sufficient to establish an adequate procedures defense under the
Bribery Act. Even though the required effectiveness of a compliance
program may be unclear, the potential benefit of an organization's
compliance program is undoubtedly more significant under the
Bribery Act.
Although not directly mandating internal compliance programs,
the accounting provisions of the FCPA similarly require international
organizations to establish, evaluate, and maintain internal control
programs. 194 Unlike the Bribery Act, the FCPA does not provide a
defense based upon an organization's compliance program. However,
the DOJ does consider "the existence and effectiveness of a
corporation's pre-existing compliance program" among other concerns
during investigations, prosecutions, and settlement offers.19 5
Nonetheless, the effectiveness of an organization's internal
compliance program typically has limited practical effect under the
FCPA. First, this provision exists among a number of other factors
that the DOJ considers when prosecuting an organization, such as:
the nature and seriousness of the offense, management wrongdoing,
self-disclosure, and the history of organizational misconduct. 196
Second, a compliance program alone is insufficient to justify failing to
prosecute an organization even if the program specifically prohibits

Alderman as stating that corporations cannot "decide that it is acceptable to have a
number of so called one off payments provided that in total they do not exceed shall we
say $20 million a year").
193.
See Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23, § 7(2) ("But it is a defence (sic) for [a relevant
commercial organization] to prove that [they] had in place adequate procedures
designed to prevent persons associated with [the organization] from undertaking such
conduct.").
194.
Although not directly mandating internal compliance programs, as a
practical matter organizations must develop internal controls to ensure that these
provisions are satisfied. See generally Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78m(b)(2), (b)(5)
(providing no direct requirement that internal controls be implemented).
195.
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY'S MANUAL 9-28.300
(2012).
196.
See id. (outlining the factors that should be considered when criminally
prosecuting a business organization).
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the conduct in question.1 97 Third, since a large majority of FCPA
cases are settled prior to litigation,1 9 8 the lack of an affirmative
defense prevents many organizations from utilizing the existence of
an effective internal compliance program as the DOJ and SEC only
recognize such considerations during the sentencing phase. 9 9
VI. A U.S. RESPONSE TO THE BRIBERY ACT 2010

For years, the United States stood as the world leader in
prosecuting foreign bribery. The enactment of the FCPA imposed
limitations upon American businesses competing internationally with
companies that were not subject to similar domestic antibribery
legislation. However, in exchange for imposing this strict standard,
the FCPA became the accepted model for countries adopting
antibribery legislation.
The adoption of the Bribery Act may significantly alter this
status quo. On the one hand, the significant jurisdictional reach of
the Bribery Act aids in leveling the playing field by imposing
regulations upon companies immune to the FCPA. However, by being
more restrictive than the FCPA, the Bribery Act may significantly
decrease the United States' control over antibribery legislation.
Therefore, if the United States desires to maintain its prominence as
a world leader on this issue, it must amend the FCPA to realign it
with the evolving international standard and help facilitate a more
coordinated international scheme of antibribery legislation.
Additionally, the United States needs to address the potential
effects the Bribery Act will have upon U.S. and international
organizations that are subject to both pieces of legislation. The
Bribery Act refuses to allow for even facilitation payments in return
for providing an internal, control-based defense. Conversely, the
FCPA refuses to allow for an organization's compliance efforts to
serve as a complete defense, while overlooking facilitation payments.

Any organization that falls under the jurisdiction of both acts will be
unable to rely upon either the FCPA's allowance for facilitation
payments or the Bribery Act's adequate procedures defense. This

197.
See id. at 9-28.800 (citing United States v. Basic Constr. Co., 711 F.2d 570,
573 (4th Cir. 1983) (holding that a corporation may be liable for actions of employees
even if "such acts were against corporate policy or express instructions")).
198.
See Pacini, supra note 12, at 565 (noting the high settlement rate of FCPA
cases); Stuart H. Deming, The Potent and Broad-Ranging Implications of the
Accounting and Record-Keeping Provisions of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 96 J.
CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 465, 500 (2006) (recognizing that FCPA settlements are
rarely subject to judicial scrutiny with most prosecutions coming in the form of SEC
civil proceedings under the accounting provisions).
See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, supra note 195 (holding that a compliance
199.
program does not justify nonprosecution).
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patchwork, de facto legislation leaves businesses subject to significant
and unnecessary uncertainty. While some, including the OECD,
desire the de facto regulatory framework the two acts have created, 200
neither country proactively decided to establish such a regime.
A. A GraduatedPenalty System: Proportional
Exclusion of FacilitationPayments
The elimination of the facilitation payment exception is an
important step that the United States must take to align the FCPA
with the global stance on bribery. Many of the original justifications
for the facilitation payment exception fail to support maintaining the
exception in the twenty-first century.
First, the historical justifications for the facilitation payment
exception have drastically reduced over time. Originally, the FCPA
caused many to fear that U.S. companies would be unable to compete
internationally against foreign companies willing to pay bribes. 20 1
While potentially relevant 30 years ago, this concern is no longer
relevant as companies subject to the broad jurisdiction of the Bribery
Act now face stricter limitations than American businesses under the
FCPA.
Additionally, the willingness of the original drafters to include
an exception for facilitation payments suggests that they believed
small, nondiscretionary bribes were less harmful than larger
denomination bribes. However, not only do these low level bribes
foster a climate of acquiescence to bribery,202 but some economists
have held that in certain circumstances low level bribes are more
destructive than the larger bribes the FCPA targets. 203
Moreover, the international standard has evolved to view
facilitation payments as corrosive, 204 evidenced by the OECD calling

200.
See GUIDANCE, supra note 16, 1 44-45, at 18 (discussing the 2009 OECD
recommendation that recognized the "corrosive effect of facilitation payments" and the
OECD's request that "adhering countries [ ] discourage companies from making such
payments");
Melisa Aguilar, New OECD Stance on Facilitation Payments,
COMPLIANCE WEEK (Dec. 18, 2009), http://www.complianceweek.com/new-oecd-stance("The Organisation (sic) for Economic
on-facilitation-payments/article/187306/
Cooperation and Development has taken a new stance on facilitation payments, urging
its member countries to encourage companies to ban or discourage [the] use [of
facilitation payments.]").
201.
See 123 CONG. REC. 38604-2, 38778, 36304 (providing statements of
Senator John Tower discussing the facilitation payments exception).
202.
See Aguilar, supra note 200, at 13 (noting that the OECD recommends the
removal of facilitation payments on account of their "corrosive effect ... [upon]
economic development and the rule of law").
See Christopher J. Waller et. al., Corruption:Top Down or Bottom Up?, 40
203.
ECON. INQUIRY 688, 688 (2002) (discussing the cumulative impact that facilitation
payments may have).
See GUIDANCE, supra note 16, IT 44-45, at 18 (discussing the 2009 OECD
204.
recommendation that recognized the "corrosive effect of facilitation payments").
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upon all its members to ban facilitation payments. 205 The United
States, once a leader in antibribery legislation, is now among only a
few other countries-Australia, Canada, New Zealand, and South
Korea-that allow facilitation payments despite the fact that the
payments are illegal in the country where they are made. 206
While the continuation of the facilitation payment exception
subjects the United States to international criticism, the actual
application of the exception itself may cause more harm to U.S.
organizations than a complete ban. First, the exception has been
construed narrowly, only applying to completely nondiscretionary
actions. 207 Additionally, little guidance exists regarding the specifics
of the exception. 208 The OECD Working Group has noted that
representatives from all business sectors "were of the opinion that the
scope of the exception for facilitation payments is unclear,
particularly what kinds of decision-making are discretionary and nondiscretionary."20 9 Finally, the aggressive, recent enforcement of the
FCPA makes this ambiguity even more costly since organizations risk
having their actions deemed outside of the exception, thus facing a
full-fledged violation of the FCPA.
The unclear boundary of the facilitation payment exception is not
the only problem companies face. The DOJ's and SEC's aggressive
prosecution and broad enforcement theories have caused
commentators to question whether the exception has, in practice,
been read out of the statute. As Professor Mike Koehler points out,
Notwithstanding the FCPA's express exception for facilitating
payments, the FCPA's legislative history, and an appellate court
decision
specifically
rejecting
the
government's
expansive
interpretation of 'obtain or retain business,' several recent FCPA
enforcement actions nevertheless allege payments made to secure

205.
See Aguilar, supra note 200, at 13 ("The Organisation (sic) for Economic
Cooperation and Development has taken a new stance on facilitation payments, urging
its member countries to encourage companies to ban or discourage [the] use [of
facilitation payments.]"); GUIDANCE, supra note 16, T$ 44-45, at 18 (discussing the
2009 OECD recommendation in which the OECD asked "adhering countries to
discourage companies from making such facilitation payments").
206.
See Aguilar, supra note 200 (recognizing the few countries that still utilize
a form of the facilitation payment exception in their antibribery legislation).
207.
See Strauss, supra note 95, at 242 (discussing United States v. Kay and the
narrow application that the court gave to the exception).
208.
See id. at 257-58 (discussing how the lack of guidance has influenced how
corporations handle facilitation payments in their compliance programs).
209.
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., UNITED SATES: PHASE 3: REPORT
ON THE APPLICATION OF THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC
OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND THE 2009 REVISED
RECOMMENDATIONS
ON COMBATING BRIBERY IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS, 1 76, at 25 (Oct. 15, 2010), available at http://www.oecd.org/dafl
-briberyininternationalbusiness/anti-briberyconventionlunitedstates-oecdanti-

briberyconvention.htm.
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foreign licenses, permits, applications, or certificates, or in connection
2 10
with customs and tax duties.

For example, in 2008, Westinghouse Air Brake Technologies
Corporation settled allegations of FCPA violations. 211 Despite
agreeing to pay significant fines, the alleged FCPA violations
concerned payments made to a government agency in India to, among
other things, "schedule pre-shipping product inspections . . . [and]

obtain issuance of product delivery certificates." 2 12 This is exactly the
type of activity the exception supposedly immunizes. 2 13
This trend will likely endure as the DOJ and SEC continue using
a wide array of broad enforcement theories to bring allegations of
FCPA violations for activities that arguably fall within the
exception. 2 14 Moreover, even if some of these actions did fall within
the exception, the fact remains that most companies settle alleged
violations. 215 Therefore, the applicability of the facilitation payment
exception is not, in practice, explored, and these settled allegations
then stand as de facto precedent for disregarding the exception. 216
The Bribery Act's failure to include a similar exception further
complicates conformity and increases compliance costs by placing the
FCPA and the Bribery Act in direct conflict. Since the accounting
provisions require that payments be accurately recorded 217 and the
Bribery Act forbids such payments, organizations subject to the FCPA
will be forced to admit a violation of the Bribery Act in order to utilize
the FCPA's facilitation payment exception or risk violating the

210.
Koehler, supra note 184, at 122.
211.
See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Westinghouse Air Brake
Technologies Corporation Agrees to Pay $300,000 Penalty to Resolve Foreign Bribery
Violations in India (Feb. 14, 2008), available at www.justice.gov/opalpr/2008/February/
08_crm 116.html.
212.
See id. ("These payments were made in order to: assist Pioneer in obtaining
and retaining business with the IRB; schedule pre-shipping product inspections; obtain
issuance of product delivery certificates; and curb what Pioneer considered to be
excessive tax audits.").
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1(b), -2(b), -3(b) (stating that the
213.
FCPA explicitly does "not apply to any facilitating or expediting payment to a foreign
official, . . . the purpose of which is to expedite or to secure the performance of a routine
governmental action").
214.
See Koehler, supra note 184, at 122-25 (summarizing the specific use of
broad "enforcement theories" against a variety of companies, including "Pride
International, Tidewater, Transocean, GlobalSantaFe," Noble Corp, Royal Dutch Shell,
NATCO Group, Snamprogetti, and Panalpina, and individuals, including "Joe
Summers, an employee of Pride International").
215.
See Pacini, supra note 12, at 565 (noting "the high settlement rate [of]
FCPA cases").
216.
See Mike Koehler, The Fagade of FCPA Enforcement, 41 GEO. J. INT'L L.
907, 976 (2010) (discussing the potential applicability of the "facilitat[ion] payment
exception" to "enforcement actions" and the failure of accused violators to apply the
relevant defense on account of settling the enforcement action).
217.
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78m(a)-(b) (requiring the accurate
recording of all payments, including facilitation payments).
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FCPA's accounting provision. Given the SFO's stated intention to
diligently prosecute unlawful payments under the Bribery Act, 2 18
without an amendment to the FCPA, this conflict creates a de facto
ban on facilitation payments for any company subject to both acts.
Considering the uncertain nature of the FCPA's facilitation payment
exception, the Bribery Act's ban on such payments may in fact make
compliance for U.S. companies easier as they now no longer need to
concern themselves with what is a permissible payment under the
FCPA.
Given these concerns, it would be prudent for the United States
to amend the FCPA in order to remove the facilitation payment
exception. However, an amendment to the FCPA need not go as far as
the Bribery Act in order to satisfy these concerns. Instead of removing
the current exception, the United States could implement a scaled or
progressive penalty system covering lower level acts of bribery.
The implementation of a progressive penalty system would
significantly benefit FCPA enforcement. Under the current system,
concealment is incentivized as companies face significant liability if a
payment is found to be outside the exception.21 9 Conversely, a limited
penalty system may increase the likelihood that companies self-report
illegal payments as they have more certainty concerning their
liability. 220 Increased reporting would generate two valuable side
effects: it would (1) incentivize self-reporting, which would aid in
bringing lower level bribery to light for foreign governments whose
officers are accepting bribes; and (2) limit liability, which would
remove some of the unjust outcomes previously discussed. However, if
such payments are found within a larger scheme of bribery, the
illegality of facilitation payments will allow the DOJ and SEC to
assert substantial leverage. Consequently, it would also be advisable
to limit the applicability of any progressive penalty system to
situations in which no corresponding scheme of bribery exists.
Additionally, a progressive penalty system would address many
of the concerns of the exception's advocates. Scholars recognize
conflicting effects that facilitation payments may have upon markets.
Facilitation payments may further increase costs of doing business in

218.
See Alderman, supra note 173 (stating that it is the SFO's intention to
prosecute many illegal payments, including payments that are excluded under the
FCPA).
219.
See generally Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, supra note 211 (agreeing
to pay a significant fine after certain payments were discovered despite arguably being
covered under the exception).
220.
This will especially be the case if Congress also adopts a complete adequate
procedures defense, as this Note suggests infra Part VI.B. In this case, a company
would be inclined to self-report small violations as they would either face no liability
under an adequate procedures defense or reduced liability if eligible for a progressive
penalty system.
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developing markets by "spawn[ing] additional demands." 221
Conversely, banning facilitation payments may amplify this effect
such that the costs of transacting in a developing market may become
prohibitively high, leading to market exit. 222 While certain cultural
practices, such as gift giving or guanxi in China, 22 3 often make
compliance with the FCPA more difficult, a progressive penalty
system could actually decrease the risks of transacting in such a
culture. Under the current system, a firm must balance respecting
cultural norms with remaining within the unclear and progressively
limited facilitation payment exception. Under a progressive penalty
system, a company may transact in a foreign market, respect cultural
traditions, and have some certainty that if such payments amount to
an FCPA violation, then their liability is limited and predefined. 224
Thereby, a progressive penalty system would incentivize market
entry as organizations could better evaluate the risks of transacting
in foreign markets.
Finally, by predefining an organization's potential liability, a
progressive penalty system has the potential to encourage selfreporting, thereby revealing more bribery, especially smaller
payments. Increased self-reporting would allow foreign nations to
start addressing the demand side of bribery through the application
of their own laws, a criticism antibribery scholars often make of
foreign countries. 225
However, one must acknowledge that reduced penalties have the
potential to counteract the original purpose of the FCPA, as
organizations may simply internalize the costs of bribery and fines as
a cost of doing business. Nevertheless, such fears can be addressed
through the proper scaling of a progressive penalty system. In
response to this concern, Congress should impose various eligibility
requirements for application of the progressive penalty system,
including: (i) a minimum level of compliance procedures; (ii) requiring
that the violation be self-reported; and (iii) restricting access to

221.
See Joseph W. Yockey, Solicitation, Extortion and The FCPA, 87 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 781, 801 (2011) ("The willingness of a firm to acquiesce to one demand
for payment can further spawn additional demands, which will then lead to continued
costs and complications as the firm becomes 'the goose that lays the golden eggs' for a
particular foreign official or group of officials.").
222.
See id. at 832 ("If the FCPA is altered to prohibit all bribe paymentsincluding facilitation payments and payments in response to economic extortion-this
[demand-side corruption] would be amplified to the extent that firms might effectively
be prevented from doing any business in some countries.").
223.
See id. (noting that, in China, well-respected "cultural and social norms"
often require the giving of gifts in the development of a business relationship called
guanxi, thus further complicating compliance with antibribery legislation).
224.
A progressive penalty system would impose a specific fine for lower level
acts of bribery, thus removing uncertainty surrounding the liability for such violations.
225.
See generally Yockey, supra note 221, at 839 (arguing that countries need
to begin "fighting corruption" and bribery from "the demand side" by prosecuting the
"foreign officials who solicit and receive bribes").
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organizations that have not had any infractions within a specified
time period. 226 While such a system does augment the risk that
organizations will internalize bribery costs, the proposed regime
would function more effectively through increased transparency and
decreased uncertainty.
B. Adoption of a Complete Adequate ProceduresDefense
The consideration given to a company's compliance procedures
differ under the Bribery Act and the FCPA. The Bribery Act considers
the extent of an organization's compliance procedures during the
liability phase, while the FCPA does not consider such procedures
until the sentencing phase. 227 In-house counsel for many of the
largest U.S. companies cite uncertain FCPA liability as a major legal
uncertainty. 228 Much of this concern stems from the difficulty
companies face in preventing a rogue worker in a foreign outpost
from paying a bribe. 229 The Ministry of Justice has similarly
recognized "the fact that no bribery prevention regime will be capable
of preventing bribery at all times."2 30
The adoption of an adequate procedures defense in the United
States is not novel as Congress proposed a defense that would
consider an organization's compliance procedures during the liability
phase in 1988.231 Additionally, high ranking regulators have proposed
similar defenses, noting that the "current law leaves largely
unresolved the central issue of when a company's compliance system

226.
A system linking a firm's compliance procedures to its eligibility for a
progressive penalty system would further incentivize the development of compliance
programs, which this Note argues, infra, should serve as a complete defense to an
FCPA violation. See infra Part VI.B (proposing the creation of an "adequate procedures
defense" to liability under the FCPA).
227.
See supra Part V.D (providing a comparative analysis of the impact of
compliance programs upon liability under the FCPA and the Bribery Act).
228.
See Jones, supra note 11, at B1 (discussing the uncertain areas of the law
that most concern in-house counsel in the United States).
229.
See id. (noting that some in-house counsel "concede the difficulty of
preventing a rogue worker in a foreign outpost from paying a bribe").
230.
GUIDANCE, supra note 16, 11, at 8.
231.
When Congress successfully passed various amendments to the FCPA, the
House of Representatives proposed such a defense as an amendment to the FCPA. See
See H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 922 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1547,1955 (failing to include the House safe harbor defense in the 1988 amendments).
While eventually conceding to the Senate, which proposed no similar amendment, the
House's bill included a safe harbor defense based upon the establishment of procedures
that were "'expected to prevent and detect' [FCPA violations]." See id. at 922-23
("Under the House bill, a firm could not be held vicariously liable for such violations if
it had established procedures 'reasonable [sic] expected to prevent and detect' any such
violation, and the officer and employee with supervisory responsibility for the offending
employee's or agent's conduct used 'due diligence' to prevent the violation.").
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and antibribery policy are sufficient, in either design or
implementation, to safeguard the corporate enterprise."2 3 2
Moreover, the recent increase in FCPA enforcement has the
potential to impact foreign relations. In the past few years, many of
the largest enforcement actions have been against foreign issuers. 233
This enforcement against foreign issuers raises concerns when
considered in conjunction with two additional factors: (1) the FCPA
has long been considered harmful to U.S. businesses on account that
it imposes competitive disadvantages upon them internationally; and
(2) these foreign issuers may be in compliance with the new
international standard of antibribery regulations through the
implementation of a first-rate compliance program. Taken together,
these factors could lead many to view FCPA enforcement against
foreign issuers as a protectionist measure whereby the United States
is imposing overly strict laws on foreign businesses while protecting
domestic businesses through selective nonenforcement.
In recognition of these concerns, the United States must offer a
complete defense to FCPA liability based upon an organization's
compliance procedures. If the United States desires to remain a world
leader in antibribery prevention and prosecution, then it must amend
the FCPA to conform to the new international standard. 234 While
other amendments suggested in this Note would subject
organizations to tougher regulations, the increased certainty and
ability to insulate oneself from liability through an adequate
procedures defense will counterbalance these sterner regulations.
Although the adoption of an adequate procedures defense could
alter the dynamic of FCPA enforcement, the adoption of the defense
itself would be rather easy to implement. Significant guidance
already exists regarding the compliance procedures the DOJ and SEC
deem adequate. 235 Further, companies can utilize the opinion

232.
James R. Doty, Toward a Reg. FCPA: A Modest Proposal for Change in
Administering the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 62 BUS. L. 1233, 1233-35 (2007)
(setting forth a safe harbor amendment to the FCPA). In 2007, James Doty, currently
the Chairman of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, suggested an
adequate procedures defense called Reg. FCPA. See id. at 1233-34 (calling for the SEC
to "formulate a 'Reg. FCPA' to guide ... implementation of anti-bribery polices, to
improve transparency and foster general acceptance of the best practices"). Notably,
while recognizing that law-enforcement officials often ignore an organization's
compliance procedures, Mr. Doty's safe harbor defense would only establish a
rebuttable presumption that the FCPA was not violated. See id. at 1245 (limiting his
safe harbor defense to the establishment of a rebuttable presumption that "could be
rebutted by a preponderance of the evidence").
See Bonneau, supra note 179, at 395 ("[Mlany of the largest FCPA
233.
settlements in recent years have been with foreign issuers.").
See supra Part VI.A (advocating for the removal of the facilitation
234.
payments exception in order to bring U.S. regulation in line with the evolving world
standard).
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines Manual provides specific guidance on
235.
what constitutes an effective compliance program in order to mitigate one's sentence.
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procedures provided for under the FCPA to obtain opinions on the
adequacy of company-specific procedures.
Consequently, this amendment could refocus U.S. efforts toward
the original goal of the FCPA, preventing the bribery of foreign
officials, instead of simply prosecuting acts of bribery. An adequate
procedures defense could provide significant benefits to the United
States, including decreasing a major source of uncertainty affecting
American businesses and incentivizing the implementation of
effective compliance programs. Moreover, it would allow a company to
greatly reduce its exposure to FCPA liability through the
implementation of a first-rate compliance program, as it may utilize
the existence of these well-known procedures as a defense prior to the
liability phase.
The adoption of an adequate procedures defense could also allow
the United States to regain its control over shaping international
antibribery enforcement. While the United Kingdom has provided an
adequate procedures defense, it has failed to provide useful guidance
on what constitutes adequate procedures. 23 6 Moreover, unlike the
FCPA, the Bribery Act fails to provide an opinion procedure through
23 7
which one can inquire about the adequacy of specific procedures.
This ambiguity under the Bribery Act establishes a window of
opportunity for the United States. Through the inclusion of an
adequate procedures defense, the United States may apply its
existing compliance guidance on adequate compliance programs. This
would provide the United States with the ability to control the focus
of compliance programs and the norms through which the adequate
procedures defense develops. However, the uncertainty surrounding
what constitutes adequate procedures under the Bribery Act will not
remain ad infinitum. In the absence of an amendment to the FCPA,
UK courts and the SFO will inevitably shape the defining
characteristics of an adequate compliance program and the adequate
procedures defense.

Additionally, DOJ deferred prosecution agreements and opinion releases provide
significant guidance on relevant aspects of FCPA compliance programs. See, e.g., U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, No. 04-02, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT REVIEW OPINION
PROCEDURE RELEASE (July 12, 2004), available at http://www.justice.gov/criminall
fraud/fcpalopinion/2004/0402.pdf (providing insights into specific aspects of a
compliance program that would potentially serve as part of an adequate FCPA
compliance program, such as a whistleblower reporting system for violations of both
the compliance program and the FCPA, along with respective disciplinary procedures
designed to prevent and address violations).
See supra text accompanying notes 157-63 (discussing the uncertainty
236.
surrounding the guidance provided by the Ministry of Justice concerning the adequate
procedures defense to the Bribery Act).
Compare Foreign Corrupt Practices Act §§ 78dd-1(e), -2(f) (requiring the
237.
Attorney General to respond to "specific inquires" through a written opinion,
addressing whether it considers certain "conduct" illegal under the FCPA), with
Bribery Act, 2010, c. 23 (no similar opinion procedure is provided for in the Bribery
Act).
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While the DOJ and SEC have provided significant guidance
covering what procedures they consider important in FCPA
compliance programs, they should consider adapting a few additional
aspects into an adequate procedures defense:
The defense should contain certain minimum procedures
in order for a company to be eligible for the defense. Such
minimum procedures will ensure that every compliance
program meets certain important criteria without limiting
the DOJ's and SEC's ability to impose additional
organization-specific requirements.
*

The defense should create a complete defense to an FCPA
violation, not simply a rebuttable presumption. 2 38 While
the use of a rebuttable presumption would allow the DOJ
and SEC to maintain significant leverage, such a
presumption will fail to effectively decrease uncertainty
surrounding FCPA liability. 2 39

*

The defense should not only assess the focus of an
organization's compliance procedures but also the focus of
the actual implementation and maintenance of the
compliance program. Improper or failed implementation
poses significant risks and will render even the best
designed system ineffective.

*

An organization attempting to set forth an adequate
procedures defense should be required to show, in
reasonable detail, how and why their current procedures
failed to alert management of the illegal activity. This
requirement will: (i) help determine if adequate
procedures were actually implemented; (ii) ensure that
senior management did not know of such information; and
(iii) force a company to find and understand the
shortcomings of its compliance system. In the future, a
related requirement would be that this shortcoming be
remedied before an organization could qualify for the
adequate procedures defense.

238.
See supra note 232 and accompanying text (noting that Mr. Doty's proposed
Reg. FCPA included an adequate procedures safe harbor defense that would only
establish a rebuttable presumption against an FCPA violation).
239.
A major source of FCPA liability comes from the fact that the SEC and
DOJ litigate few FCPA cases as companies often settle allegations of FCPA violations.
See Pacini, supra note 12, at 565 (noting "the high settlement rate [of] FCPA cases").
The use of such a rebuttable presumption will serve to require costly trials and
potential exposure to uncertain liability, thereby similarly encouraging settlement.
Without a complete defense, the adequate procedures defense will do little to increase
certainty as to a company's potential exposure to the FCPA.
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VII. CONCLUSION

Two independent developments in the antibribery sector are
placing significant pressure upon the current state of the FCPA: (1)
the increased prosecutorial effort of U.S. regulators has led to
significant uncertainty concerning FCPA liability; and (2) the
adoption of the Bribery Act has exposed the FCPA as an outdated
piece of legislation that has failed to keep pace with the evolving
international standard. Moreover, the adoption of the Bribery Act
directly affects U.S. organizations on account of its broad jurisdiction
and the imposition of strict liability. These two independent
developments are interrelated as the passage of the Bribery Act has
further increased the uncertainty of FCPA liability.
Through the adoption of two amendments to the FCPA, the
United States could resolve significant issues relating to the FCPA.
Removal of the current facilitation payment exception will
significantly reduce uncertainty surrounding FCPA liability.
Additionally, through the use of a progressive penalty system,
Congress could supplement the detection and prosecution efforts of
the DOJ and SEC through increased transparency, establishing an
overall more effective antibribery regime.
Nonetheless, to bring the FCPA in line with the current
international standard, the United States must also adopt an
adequate procedures defense, similar to the defense included in the
Bribery Act. Such an amendment would serve a far greater purpose
than solely coordinating the FCPA with the new international
standard. This amendment would drastically reduce a significant
source of ambiguity. Furthermore, this amendment would provide the
United States with the means to utilize the limited window currently
available to regain its significant influence in shaping the trajectory
of future international antibribery legislation.
Taken together, these amendments would establish a far more
efficient scheme to prevent organizations from bribing foreign
officials. Although the FCPA was originally a trailblazing piece of
legislation, Congress has failed to maintain the FCPA as the world
model for antibribery legislation. Recent developments have further
.uncovered the need to modernize the FCPA. Continued inaction will
only exacerbate these growing concerns.
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